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I.

INTRODUCTION

Healthcare fraud is a growing problem in the United States-3% to
10% of spending on healthcare is wasted because of fraud.' The federal
government 2 and others 3 are using computerized data mining to identify and

*
Colin Caffrey is an attorney. He wants to thank his family for their support and
his friends, especially Cory Kestner and Mike Kogut, for their advice and guidance.
1. Julie Appleby, Medical Claims "Mined" to Find Fraud, USA TODAY, Nov. 7,
2006, at lB.
2.
Press Release, U.S. Justice Dep't, Medicare Fraud Strike Force Operations Lead
to Charges Against 53 Doctors, Healthcare Executives, and Beneficiaries for More than $50
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mitigate this type of fraud. Data mining analyzes the prior acts of a provider
to find patterns that might be indicative of this type of fraud.4 This article
will consider the use of information gleaned from data mining in a criminal
trial. It will examine whether information so gleaned can be admitted under
the law of evidence. First, this article will provide background on the use of
data mining to detect fraud. Then it will consider three threshold evidentiary questions: (1) whether prior acts by a physician are competent evidence against him in a criminal trial; (2) whether an expert's testimony on
data mining is proper expert testimony, meaning is this subject a proper one
for expert testimony and may an expert testify about his conclusions based
on data mining; and (3) whether the methodology of data mining satisfies
the relevant standard of Frye or Daubert, and thus is an appropriate basis
for expert testimony. It will analyze these questions under both the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the common law.
II.

AN EXPLANATION OF DATA MINING

Out of all the claims filed it is difficult to identify a single act as
fraud.5 Data mining takes advantage of the fact that most fraudfeasors
commit many acts of fraud.6 Data mining finds the fraudulent claims by
looking for patterns of billing irregularities created by the repeated fraud.7
Computerized data mining is able to analyze the relationships between two
hundred million electronic claims records.8
Data mining uses artificial intelligence to find these patterns. 9 Analyzing a massive amount of data, computers are able to find unusual patterns in
the data' using tools like statistical models, mathematical algorithms, and
machine learning. I ' The results of these analyses create parameters, which
Million

in

Alleged

False

Billing in

Detroit

(June

24,

2009),

available at

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-623.html.
3.
Jeffrey W. Seifert, Data Mining and the Search for Security: Challenges for
Connecting the Dots and Databases,21 GOv'T INFO. Q. 461, 463 (2004).
4.
Sue Ashton-Davies, Data Mining Digs Deep in High-Tech War Against Fraud,
AUSTRALIAN, May 26, 1998, at 36.

5.
James L. Garcia, Using Technology to Fight Fraud:New Software Systems Sift
through Mountains of Data to Give Healthcare Fraud Investigators the Upper Hand in
Combating Crooks, HEALTH MGMT. TECH., Jan. 2002, at 32, 34.
6.
Id. at 34.
7.
Robert Regis Hyle, CriminalMinds, TECH DECISIONS, Feb. 2009, at 22, 24.
8. Mark Taylor, HighTtech Software Sleuthing. New Computer Tools Give Government Tighter Handle on Hard-to-Track HealthcareFraud, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Dec.
4, 2000 at 46, 46.
9.
Ashton-Davies, supra note 4, at 36.
10.
Emma Young, Drillingfor Data, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 15, 1996, at
Computers 1.
11.
Seifert, supra note 3, at 463.
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are then used to analyze the records of the practitioners.' 2 Parameters are3
statistics derived not from a sample, but from an entire population of data.'
For example, records of practitioners are compared to a previously identified parameter: computer identified suspicious patterns. 14 During the comparison, those billing records might then be run through as many as three
hundred
algorithms to fird suspicious activity that conforms to these pat5
terns.'
16
Data mining is one of the most important tools for detecting fraud.
These techniques have proven to be very effective at fighting fraud by identifying suspicious billing. Agencies can then investigate the fraud. 17 The
United Kingdom Insurance Fraud Bureau has used these techniques to
detect fraud and save eight million pounds.1 8 These techniques were also
used by the FBI to detect healthcare fraud committed in Boston. 9

III.

THE USE OF INFORMATION OBTAINED BY DATA MINING AS
EVIDENCE

Since data mining is becoming an important and effective investigatory tool, this article will now look at whether it is admissible as evidence.
A.

QUESTION ONE: WHETHER THE USE OF PRIOR ACTS BY PRACTITIONERS

IS PROPER UNDER THE LAW OF EVIDENCE?

Data mining identifies patterns of suspicious billing. 20 Since it compares the bills submitted by a practitioner over time to find unusual patterns, and thus fraudulent activity, the prohibition against propensity evi12.

Id.

13.
SAM KASH KACHIGAN, MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 9-10 (1982). This
article notes that, for the purpose of legal analysis, it will treat statistics and parameters as
the same because the only difference is from what they are derived.
14.
Karen Dearne, Cheats Unearthed as Data Miners Dig, AUSTRALIAN, June 19,
2001, at 43 (quoting Jolie Reichel, National Research Manager of MBF, one of Australia's
largest insurance companies).
15.
Nathan Conz, Stopping FraudBefore it Occurs: Medical Mutual of Ohio Leverages VIPS' Star Sentential Software to Identify PotentiallyFraudulentClaims Activity as It
Comes Through the Door DiscouragingFraudBefore It Begins, INS. & TECH., May 2008, at
13, 13.
16.
Deame, supra note 14, at 43 (quoting Jolie Reichel, National Research Manager
of MBF, one of Australia's largest insurance companies).
17.
Charles Babcock & Marianne Kolbesuk McGee, Filter out Frauds, INS. &
TECH., Sept. 2004, at 40, 42.
18.
Ian Grant, Data Mining Increases InsuranceFraudArrests, COMPUTER WKLY.,
Aug. 14, 2007, at 133, 133.
19.
Taylor, supra note 8, at 46.
20.
Hyle, supranote 7, at 22, 23.
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dence is implicated. The question becomes: Is using prior suspicious bills
and discussing the suspicious patterns as evidence consistent with the law's
ban on propensity evidence? This article will now discuss that question
under both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the common law of evidence.
1.

Under the FederalRules ofEvidence

The answer to this question is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b). The relevant portion of the rule states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident ... 21
This rule only prohibits using prior bad acts to prove character. 22 Prior acts
can be admitted to show lack of good faith and intent.23
In United States v. Wales, the government was allowed to introduce
prior acts by a smuggler to show his intent to smuggle goods.24 The government was allowed to show that the defendant knew how to fill out customs forms. 25 The government introduced this evidence to prove he intentionally did not declare items on his customs form.26
In United States v. Erikson, which involved a medical fraud prosecution, the government introduced evidence of prior acts by the defendantdoctor.2 7 The defendant in that case was accused of improperly billing Medicare. 28 He was accused of billing the government for twenty-seven hours of
service during a workday. 29 As part of its case, the government introduced
evidence that the doctor had previously engaged in improper billing practices. 30 The government introduced evidence of those prior billing practices
even though the defendant doctor had not been accused of a crime in rela21.
FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
22.
United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 672 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing United States
v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723, 731 (8th Cir. 1996)).
23.
United States v. Walls, 577 F.2d 690, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing United
States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1079 (9th Cir. 1975)).
24.
977 F.2d 1323, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 1992).
25.
Id.
26.
Id.
27.
75 F.3d 470, 477-79 (9th Cir. 1996).
28.
Id. at 473.
29.
Id. at 474.
30.
Id. at 477-79.

2010]

CANA COMPUTER READ A DOCTOR'S MIND?

tion to them. 3' Specifically citing Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the
court upheld the admission of this evidence.32
Admitting evidence from data mining is no different than admitting
the evidence of improper billing from Erikson. In Erikson, the prior acts
were found by human beings.33 Data mining uses patterns to find the prior
acts. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) makes no provision for treating prior
acts found by humans
any differently than prior acts found by computer
34
mining.
data
using
2.

Under the Common Law

This section of the article will discuss the question under the common
law. Since most states have adopted some version of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the focus will be on the major states that have not adopted it:
Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York; however, a pre-rules case from
another jurisdiction will be used for illustrative purposes.
The common law bars prior acts evidence admitted to show propensity.35 They are admissible for any other purpose,3 6 including showing the

defendant's guilty knowledge 37 or intent. 38 Proving fraud requires proving
intent, so prior acts are relevant to show that a practitioner did not simply
make a mistake in billing, but to show he truly had the requisite intent when
he improperly billed.
The law recognizes that prior acts are probative as to intent 39 and is a
reason to admit prior acts. 40 The New York Court of Appeals stated:
"[E]vidence of uncharged crimes or acts may be admissible to show, inter
alia, the defendant's intent to commit the crime charged. '

31.
Id. at 478.
32.
Erickson, 75 F.3d at 478.
33.
Id. at 477.
34.
See FED R. EvID. 404(b).
35.
Illinois v. Gilliam, 670 N.E.2d 606, 620 (I11.1997) (citing Illinois v. Stewart,
473 N.E.2d 840, 859 (I11.1984)).
36.
Massachusetts v. Garrey, 765 N.E.2d 725, 736 (Mass. 2002) (citing Massachusetts v. Martino, 588 N.E.2d 651, 659 (Mass. 1992)).
37.
New York v. Alvino, 519 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1987) (citing New York v.
Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (N.Y. 1901)).
38.
Massachusetts v. Gollman, 762 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass. 2002) (citing Massachusetts v. Helfant, 496 N.E.2d 433, 441 (Mass. 1986)).
39.
Id. (citing Helfant, 496 N.E.2d at 441).
40.
Helfant, 496 N.E.2d at 441 (citing Massachusetts v. Schoening, 396 N.E.2d
1004, 1009 (Mass. 1979)).
41.
People v. Lynch, 63 A.D.3d 959, 2009 WL 1694124, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div.
June 16, 2009) (citing Alvino, 519 N.E.2d at 812).
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The rationale of this rule was explained long ago in People v. Dolan.4 2
In that case, the defendant was charged with the uttering of forged notes.4 3
As part of its case-in-chief the prosecution showed that the defendant had
uttered other forged notes. 44 The court explained its reasoning by citing and
analyzing their earlier decisions in People v. Sharp45 and People v. Ever4 7 The
hardt.46 The appellate court began with a discussion of Everhardt.
court observed that a defendant's knowledge of the forgery was a necessary
element of the crime of uttering. 48 The court then stated that the purpose for
showing other forgeries was to show the defendant's intent. 49 The Dolan
court explained the rationale by citing People v. Sharp.5 ° The court explained:
"A man might think" said Judge Peckham in People v.
Sharp, "the money he passed was good, and he might be
mistaken once or even twice; but the presumption of mistake lessens with every repetition of the act of passing
money really counterfeit." The latter observation very
tersely states a rule that is applicable to prosecutions for
forgery as to cases of passing counterfeit money.51
Even before this case had been decided, courts5 had extended the Everhardt
rationale to cases of larceny by false pretenses. 2
This principle was applied by the New York Court of Appeals in
People v. Marrin.53 In that case, the commissioner of deeds was convicted
of acknowledging a deed with the name James Cahill, a nonexistent person,54 as part of a land transaction. The prosecution was allowed to show
that he had forged other deeds with that name to prove that he did not mistakenly and innocently endorse the deed for another claiming to be James
Cahill. 56 This demonstrated that the defendant was the one who had swin42.
43.
44.
45.

78 N.E. 569 (N.Y. 1906).
Id.
Id.
People v. Sharp, 14 N.E. 319 (N.Y. 1887).

47.
48.
49.

Dolan, 78 N.E. at 570 (citing Everhardt, 11 N.E. at 62).
Id.
Id.

46.

50.
ted).

51.

52.

53.
54.
55.
56.

People v. Everhardt, 11 N.E. 62 (N.Y. 1887).

See id. at 570.

Id. (citing Sharp, 14 N.E. 319, 343-44 (Peckham, J., concurring)) (citation omitMayer v. People, 80 N.Y. 364, 373-74 n.al (N.Y. 1880).

98 N.E. 474 (N.Y. 1912).
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id.
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died the victim. 57 This ruling is still good law; it was recently cited by the
court of appeals in a discussion about propensity evidence.58
Currently, courts applying common law continue to apply this principle. For example, in Commonwealth v. Imbruglia, the defendant was accused of trafficking in counterfeit bonds and currency. 59 Previous instances
where the defendant had sold counterfeit bonds and currency were admissi60
ble to show he intended to sell counterfeit bonds and currency. In People
v. Illgen, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the admission of prior instances
of abuse by the defendant against the victim.61 In that case, the defendant
was accused of murdering his wife.62 In his defense, the accused maintained
used to
that the shooting was accidental. 63 The prior instances of abuse were
64
show that the defendant had the requisite intent to murder his wife.
Prior acts have long been used to show a physician's criminal intent.
In State v. Raub,65 the defendant stood accused of illegally prescribing
whiskey.6 6 The state introduced evidence showing that he had prescribed
whiskey to fifty-six other patients. 67 The Washington Supreme Court held
that the number of prescriptions written was admissible to show that the
doctor had not written those prescriptions in good faith.68 The court held:
But the gravemen [sic] of the offense is not in the doing of
the deed, but in the faith in which it was done. The rule
seems to have grown out of the necessities of the statute,
for the act itself is presumptively a lawful act sanctioned by
statute. It is rendered unlawful, when and only when, the
writer of the prescription abuses the confidence that is reposed in him and by the injection of the subtle quality of
bad faith thwarts the police power of the state. From the nature of things, good or bad faith can only be proved by
resort to circumstances and sidelights. If it were otherwise-if the mere giving of a prescription or a number of
57.
Id.
58.
People v. Rojas, 760 N.E.2d 1265, 1267 (N.Y. 2001).
59.
387 N.E.2d 559, 561 (Mass. 1979).
60.
Id. at 566.
583 N.E.2d 515,522 (111. 1991).
61.
Id. at 518.
62.
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at 522.
65.
173 P. 1094 (Wash. 1918). Raub was decided before Washington adopted its
Rules of Evidence. See id.
Id. at 1095. Prescribing whiskey for non-medical purposes was, at that time,
66.
illegal. See id. at 1094-95.
67.
Id. at 1094.
68.
Id. at 1095.
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prescriptions by a licensed physician would bar further inquiry-the law would be emasculated of its purpose. It is
not going beyond the range of judicial vision to say that
liquor has not always been regarded as a cure-all or touchstone of health, but that it has grown in popular favor as a
remedy as the chance of procuring it has grown remote;
and, although a physician who prescribes it may be imposed upon at times, a general dispensation of the remedy
at or about the time charged is sufficient to put him to the
defense of his good intention before a jury of his country69
men.
The court in Raub identified long ago the problems with prosecuting doctors: often times an individual act by a doctor is not obviously illegal. However, the repetition or the pattern of acts show the liability. The Raub court
recognized this and allowed in the doctor's prior acts.70
3.

Conclusion

Using the prior acts of a physician to prove his criminal liability is not
novel. It is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the common law. It also has deep roots in the common law. Data mining is simply a
new way to find, analyze, and interpret a physician's prior acts. The next
section of this article will discuss whether it is appropriate for an expert
witness to testify about what data mining says about those prior acts.
B.

QUESTION 2: IS TESTIMONY BASED ON DATA MINING PROPER EXPERT

TESTIMONY?

This article will now discuss whether testimony concerning datamined evidence is proper expert testimony. This article will consider that
question under both the Federal Rules of Evidence and common law.
1.

Under the FederalRules

There are three main issues to be dealt with concerning whether datamined evidence is proper expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The first is whether the subject is one about which expert testimony
may be heard. The second is whether expert testimony may be heard on
intent. The last issue is the effect Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) has on
testimony about intent.
69.
70.

Id.
Raub, 173 P. at 1094.
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The first issue is governed by the first part of Federal Rule of Evidence
702 stating: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert... may testify thereto .... ,71 This
standard allows for the exclusion of expert testimony only when a trier of
fact would be as able to understand an issue as well as an expert.72 Expert
testimony brings73specialized knowledge to an issue, helping the trier of fact
to understand it.
Medical billing is a highly complex and technical field.74 No typical
trier of fact has an understanding of the complex regulations governing
billing, particularly Medicare billing.7 5 The Sixth Circuit held that portions
of testimony of Medicare auditors concerning descriptions of Medicare
rules and regulations and background information on Medicare 76 should not
have been allowed as lay testimony.7 7
The second issue concerns whether expert testimony on intent is proper. This answer too is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The applicable section of that rule states expert testimony is proper if it "will assist
the trier of fact ... to determine a fact in issue. '' 78 Courts have held that this
allows fact finders to draw inferences of intent from expert testimony.7 9 In
United States v. Doe, an expert was allowed to testify about the practices of
drug couriers,
so that the jury could infer that the defendants had the requi80
site intent.
In United States v. Dotson, a tax evasion case, the court held that expert testimony concerning the defendant's actions was proper. 8' The expert
was allowed to testify that the defendant's actions were consistent with tax
evasion. 82 In United States v. Brawner, experts were allowed to testify that
a defendant's actions were consistent with telemarketing fraud.83 The expert

71.

FED. R. EVID. 702.
72.
Corneveaux v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498, 1505 (10th Cir. 1996)
(citing United States v. Rice, 52 F.3d 843, 847 (10th Cir. 1995)).
73.
United States v. Conn, 297 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v.
Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 641 (8th Cir. 2001)).
74.
See United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 401 (6th Cir. 2007).
75.
Id. at 403-04 (citing United States v. Strange, 23 F. App'x 715, 717 (9th Cir.
2001)).
76.
Id. at 404.
77.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
78.
United States v. Dunn, 846 F.2d 761, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
79.
149 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1998).
80.
81.
817 F.2d 1127, 1131-32 (5th Cir. 1987).
82.
Id.at 1132.
83.
173 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 1999).
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explained the telemarketing fraud to the jury.8 4 The court held that the average juror was unfamiliar with telemarketing fraud.85
In City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., an anti-trust case,
the court allowed expert testimony based on statistics. 86 The defendants
were accused of conspiring to fix the prices of chlorine in Alabama.87 The
expert statistically analyzed events occurring in the Alabama chlorine market. 88 He was allowed to testify about his statistical analysis of the Alabama
chlorine market
so that the trier of fact could better understand what was
89
happening.
In Shad v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc, the defendants were accused of
churning-the excessive trading of brokerage accounts by the broker so that
he may reap profits by earning commissions.9" The plaintiffs expert proposed to testify that churning occurred. 91 He had examined the records of
the plaintiffs accounts. 92 He identified patterns of trading that indicated
that churning occurred. 93 The Ninth Circuit held that this testimony was
proper under Federal94Rule of Evidence 702, and that the trial court had improperly excluded it.
Courts have also held that computer-generated analysis 95 and statistical
analysis 96 are proper bases for expert testimony concerning intent. Courts
have also held expert testimony explaining fraud is proper. Expert testimony based on data mining is no different than the expert testimony in Shad
and Tuscaloosa in that the analysis is done by computer rather than by a
statistician. Like the expert testimony in those cases, data mining looks for
98
abnormal patterns. 97 Computer analysis is also accepted by the courts.
Viewing these cases together, there is no reason why expert testimony
based on data mining should be excluded by the courts.

84.
Id. at 968-69.
85.
Id.
86.
158 F.3d 548, 563-64 (11 th Cir. 1998).
87.
Id. at 554.
88.
Id. at 563.
89.
Id. at 565-66.
90.
799 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1986).
91.
Id. at 528.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 529-30.
95.
See, e.g., McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Serv., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
96.
See, e.g., Schanzer v. United Tech. Corp., 120 F. Supp. 2d 200, 206-07 (D.
Conn. 2000).
97.
Hyle, supra note 7, at 22, 24.
98.
See, e.g., McReynolds, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
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Data-mined evidence satisfies Federal Rule of Evidence 702. This article will now consider whether Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) bars this
type of testimony. Rule 704(b) states:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state
or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an
opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did
not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. 99
There is a circuit split as to what extent this rule applies to expert testimony concerning intent. Some circuits have held that this rule only bars
mental health experts from testifying as to intent.'00 Other circuits have held
that this rule bars all experts from giving an opinion concerning the defendant's mental state. 01 This article will first discuss the rule in circuits that
only bar mental health experts from testifying as to intent; it will then discuss the second view.
The Seventh Circuit has said the key difference between mental health
experts and other experts is that mental health experts base their opinions
on "special personal knowledge."' 1 2 Law enforcement officers have been
allowed to testify that the presence of a gun indicates that the defendant
intended to deal drugs. 10 3 The data-mining experts are like the police experts-they testify that the patterns indicate that the defendant doctor intended to defraud the government, just as police experts testify that the
presence of the gun indicates an intent to deal drugs.
Even in the more restrictive circuits, Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b)
does not bar all expert testimony relevant to intent.' °4 In those circuits experts may testify, but they may not draw the ultimate inference.' 05 In United
States v. Morales, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant, charged with
willfully making false entries, should have been allowed to call an expert to
testify to her weak grasp of bookkeeping principles. 10 6 In another case, a
DEA agent was allowed to 07
testify that the amount of cocaine possessed
indicated intent to distribute.'
99.
FED. R. EvID. 704(b).
100.
United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1997).
101.
Id.
102.
United States v. Blount, 502 F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing United States
v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1242 (7th Cir. 1994)).
103.
Blount, 502 F.3d at 679.
104.
Morales, 108 F.3d at 1037.
105.
Id. at 1038.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.(citing United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 502 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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The data-mining experts are doing nothing more than what the experts
in Morales and Gomez-Norena were allowed to do. Like the bookkeeping
expert, they are not testifying as to what the defendant thought; they are
merely providing information to assist the trier of fact in inferring intent.
2.

Under the Common Law

This article will now discuss whether expert testimony based on data
mining is proper under the common law. Expert testimony under the common law is permitted if the subject is one about which expert testimony
may be heard and is relevant. 0 8 This article will first consider whether the
subject matter is one on which expert testimony may be heard. Then it will
consider if it is relevant, and if so, whether it may heard without violating
the prohibition on testimony on an ultimate issue. Finally, it will consider
whether an expert may base his or her testimony on the type of mathematical analysis that underlies data mining.
Two standards determine whether the subject is one in which expert
testimony may be heard. Some common law courts have adopted the assistthe-trier-of-fact-standard of the federal rules rather than the traditional necessary-to-assist-the-trier-of-fact-standard.10 9 The testimony gleaned from
data mining is admissible under both these standards.
Under the more restrictive standard, a police officer was allowed to
testify, as an expert, that circumstances indicated that seized drugs were not
for personal use."0 Under the more liberal standard, a police officer was
allowed to testify as an expert about street gang culture." '
In Noah v. Bowery Savings Bank, a venerable case decided under the
more restrictive standard, the court explained how these principles are applicable to data mining." 2 That case concerned the deposit of a forged
money order." 3 The court held that it was permissible to call, and that the
plaintiff should have called, an expert witness concerning the bank's procedures for dealing with potentially forged money orders," 14 because the procedures for dealing with forgeries were beyond the knowledge of a juror. "'

108.
also People
109.
469 N.E.2d
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 702 N.E.2d 395, 397 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998); see
v. Loera, 619 N.E.2d 1300, 1311-12 (111. App. Ct. 1993).
See People v. Enis, 564 N.E.2d 1155, 1164 (111.
1990) (citing People v. Jordan,
569, 576 (I11.1984)).
See Commonwealth v. Gollman, 762 N.E.2d 847, 851-52 (Mass. 2002).
See Loera, 619 N.E.2d atl311-12.
122 N.E. 235 (N.Y. 1919).
Id. at 235.
Id. at 236-37.
Id. at 237.
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The procedures concerning medical billing are complicated.' 1 6 They
are at least as complicated as a bank's procedures for validating a money
order. They are at least as unfamiliar to a trier of fact as gang culture or
drug dealing. If a police officer's testimony about gang culture would be
helpful to the jury, then expert testimony about a complex field like medical
billing would be helpful as well. If a police officer's testimony about circumstances surrounding drug dealing was necessary to assist the trier of
fact, then an expert's testimony about the circumstances surrounding fraudulent medical billing would also be necessary to assist a trier of fact. If,
under the more restrictive common law standard, an expert would be allowed to testify about bank procedures or drug dealing, and, under the more
liberal standard, to testify about gang culture, an expert should be allowed
to testify about medical billing under both the more restrictive standard and
the more liberal standard.
The next question considered is whether expert testimony on intent is
relevant under the common law. The rule, as stated by the New York Court
of Appeals, is that expert testimony is admissible if it is relevant to the facts
of the case.' 17 Relevant evidence is evidence that touches upon a matter at
issue and helps the finder of fact ascertain the truth of the matter.1' 8 As discussed above, data mining helps the finder of fact determine the doctor's
state of mind.
In People v. Polanco, the New York Appellate Division allowed an
expert to testify that guns and drug paraphernalia in an apartment showed
that the apartment was a stash house." 9 This was held to be relevant to the
question of the defendant's intent.120 In People v. Free, an Illinois case, a
psychologist testified that PCP would not prevent a defendant from forming
the intent to kill.21
Evidence derived from data mining is relevant. The data-mining expert
is doing what the experts in Polanco and Free did. The data-mining expert
is using his expertise to provide information that the jury can use to infer
intent. This rule is limited by the ultimate issue prohibition.
Experts have been traditionally barred from giving their opinion on an
ultimate issue. 122 This section of the article will discuss to what extent that
Cf United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 391-92 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United
116.
States v. Strange, 23 F. App'x 715, 717 (9th Cir. 2001)).
See People v. Allweiss, 396 N.E.2d 735, 740 (N.Y. 1979) (citing Dougherty v.
117.
Milliken, 57 N.E. 757, 759 (N.Y. 1900)).
See Porter v. Valentine, 41 N.Y.S. 507, 508 (N.Y. App. Term 1896) (citing
118.
Platner v. Platner, 78 N.Y. 90 (1879)).
856 N.Y.S.2d 601, 602-03 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
119.
120.
Id.
1983).
447 N.E.2d 218, 233 (Ill.
121.
122.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mendrala, 480 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Mass. App. Ct.
1985).
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rule exists today, and how it would affect the testimony of an expert in data
mining.
An expert cannot give an opinion as to a defendant's guilt or innocence. 123 An expert's testimony, however, can touch on the ultimate issue.124 In Commonwealth v. Tanner, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals
discussed exactly what this distinction means. 125 It held that expert testimony must be "explanatory,"' 126 not conclusory. 127 Explanatory evidence helps
the trier or triers of fact interpret evidence that they would normally be unable to interpret.'28 In Tanner, the court held that a police officer's expert
testimony that the defendant engaged in a drug transaction was improper
because it29was too conclusory and thus impinged on the fact finding role of
the jury. 1
This rule does not bar all testimony by an expert interpreting a defendant's acts. In People v. Ingram, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, stated that an expert could testify that certain acts and circumstances were consistent
with the sale of drugs, without running afoul of the
30
ultimate issue rule.
The testimony of data-mining experts concerning their findings is
clearly explanatory. The process of medical billing is incredibly complicated. 131 It is beyond the ability of a lay juror to understand. 32 The data
mining experts are explaining how the patterns of billing are consistent with
healthcare fraud. The expert testimony helps the trier of fact interpret the
complex billing records. They are like the experts in Polanco and Free,
whose testimony is used to explain complex circumstances so that the trier
of fact may infer intent.
Next, this article turns to whether an expert may testify to the probability of something. Data mining is analysis of probabilities-it finds unusual
billing patterns. There is a paucity of state decisions concerning this. Courts
have held that an expert may testify as to probabilities if his underlying
123.
See Commonwealth v. Tanner, 700 N.E.2d 282, 285-86 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998)
(citing Commonwealth v. Colin C., 643 N.E.2d 19, 22-23 (Mass. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Cordero, 614 N.E.2d 1000, 1000 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); Commonwealth v. Pikul, 511
N.E.2d 336, 339-40 (Mass. 1987)).
124.
See Mendrala,480 N.E.2d at 1042.
125.
700 N.E.2d 282 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
126.
Id.at 286-87.
127.
Id. at 286.
128.
Id. (citing Colin C., 643 N.E.2d at 22-23; Cordero, 614 N.E.2d at 1000-01;
Commonwealth v. Munera, 578 N.E.2d 418,421-22 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991)).
129.
Id.at 287.
130.
770 N.Y.S.2d 294, 296 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (citing Matott v. Ward, 48
N.Y.2d 455, 459 (N.Y. 1979)).
131.
See United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 403-04 (6th Cir. 2007).
132.
See id.
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methodology is valid. 33 Courts have therefore held, at least implicitly, that
an expert testimony based on statistics is proper.
In People v. Miller, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed an expert to
testify to results of a DNA analysis based on statistics. 34 The court overruled an earlier case prohibiting the use of this type of analysis, because the
court found that the methodology had gained general acceptance and thus
satisfied Illinois' rule on determining whether a methodology is valid. 135 In
People v. Wesley, the New York Court of Appeals allowed the introduction
of DNA evidence in that state 136 remarking that
37 the underlying probability
analysis had been generally accepted as valid. 1
DNA typing relies upon a computer to analyze the results. 38 Although
courts have not specifically ruled that an expert may use a computer to conduct a statistical analysis, they have implicitly allowed this by allowing
DNA evidence.
An expert testifying about data mining is similar to the experts in Miller and Wesley. DNA analysis consists of comparing patterns of DNA from
two samples to determine if they match.139 A healthcare data-mining expert
is comparing the patterns of billing by a provider to other patterns to find
unusual patterns. Both are using a valid underlying methodology to obtain
results which are then explained to the jury. Like the DNA testimony
above, the results of data mining should be admissible.
3.

Conclusion

Expert testimony based on data mining is admissible under both the
Federal Rules of Evidence and common law. Testimony on the complicated
subject would assist the trier of fact. An expert may give testimony relevant
to intent without violating Rule 704(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
An expert may base his testimony on computer and statistical analysis.
Under the common law, medical billing is complicated enough so that
expert testimony may be heard on it. The evidence is relevant because intent of a provider is a fact in issue, and the expert is providing information
from which the trier of fact may infer intent. An expert may base his testi-

133.
People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721, 731 (111. 1996), abrogated by In re Commitment of Simmons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (111. 2004).
134.
Id.
135.
Id. (regarding use of material outside the record to determine if Frye standard
was met).
136.
83 N.Y.2d417 (N.Y. 1994).
137.
Id.
138.
Miller, 670 N.E.2d at 730.
139.
Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d at 441-42.
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mony on statistical analysis if the underlying methodology is valid. This
article now turns to an analysis of the underlying methodology.
C.

QUESTION 3: DOES THE METHODOLOGY OF DATA MINING SATISFY THE
DAUBERT OR FRYE STANDARD?

This section discusses whether or not data mining is an appropriate basis for expert testimony. There are two major standards for determining
whether an expert's underlying methodology is valid: Frye and Daubert.
First, this article will discuss whether data mining is a proper basis under
the Daubert standard; then this article will discuss whether it is a proper
basis under the Frye standard.
1.

The Daubert Standard

The admissibility of expert testimony in the federal system is governed
by Federal Rule of Evidence 702. In Daubert v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court held that this rule established a gate keeper
function for the courts. 40 The courts were charged with determining whether an expert's testimony was reliable.' 4 1 Courts have set out many factors
for determining reliability. 142 In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Su140.
141.
142.
factors:

509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 702 (advisory committee's note). The committee's note lists five

(1) whether the expert's technique or theory can be or has been testedthat is, whether the expert's theory can be challenged in some objective
sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach
that cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the
known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied;
(4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5)
whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the
scientific community.
Id. The note then lists five more factors: (1) whether the opinion grows from independent
research or was developed for the purposes of litigation, (2) whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unjustified conclusion, (3) whether the
expert has adequately accounted for alternative explanations, (4) whether the expert has
exercised the care appropriate to professional work, and (5) whether the field is known to
reach reliable results in the area of the proposed testimony. Id. Other factors in addition to
those in the advisory committee note are (1) nonjudical uses and experience with the process
or technique, (2) its novelty and relationship to other methods of analysis, (3) the qualifications and professional stature of the expert witness, (4) the types of error experienced,
whether likely to favor the offering or understate what he seeks to prove, and (5) the existence of a body of professional literature appraising the process or technique which tends to
insure widespread attention or critical scrutiny. Id.; see also United States v. Downing, 753
F.2d 1224, 1237-42 (3d Cir. 1985).
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preme Court found that this rule applied to all expert testimony, not only
testimony based on scientific experiments. 143 In Anderson v. Westinghouse
Savannah River Co., the Fourth Circuit applied the Daubert standard via
Kumho to statistical techniques.144
Courts have flexibility in determining how to apply the Daubert standard. 145 In United States v. Conn, the Seventh Circuit explained this by saying that "the measure of intellectual rigor will vary by the field of expertise
and the way of demonstrating expertise will vary.', 146 This means that the
courts can pick and choose which factors to use in determining the reliability of an expert's methodology. 147 In cases involving statistical evidence, not
all Daubert factors are relevant.148 This article will now discuss those factors most relevant to the analysis of data mining. The general acceptance
factor will be discussed in the next section concerning the Frye standard.
The first factor to be considered is non-judicial use. Methodologies
that have uses outside litigation are considered more reliable.149 The Sixth
Circuit has stated that "[w]e have been suspicious of methodologies created
for the purpose of litigation, because 'expert witnesses are not always unbiased scientists. '"' 150 In that case, the court rejected an expert's methodology for determining whether the designs51 of toy trains had been copied because it was created for the case at bar.'
In United States v. Ewell, a district court allowed a new type of DNA
test to be used. 52 One of the factors in the decision was that the test was
used outside the judicial context. 153
Data mining is more like the DNA test than the design comparison in
Mike's Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, L.L.C. 154 Data mining has been used
extensively outside the judicial context by the banking and insurance industries to detect fraud. 55 Fifty-two percent of Fortune 1000 companies use
143.
526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
144.
406 F.3d 248, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2005).
145.
Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citing United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2000)).
146.
297 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt, 102
F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1996)).
147.
Chapman v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing United
States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d 476, 485 (7th Cir. 1998)).
148.
City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems. Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 563 n.16 (11th Cir.
1998) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993)).
149.
Mike's Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, L.L.C., 472 F.3d 398, 408 (6th Cir. 2006)
(citing Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1352 (6th Cir. 1992)).
150.
Mike's TrainHouse, Inc., 472 F.3d at 408 (quoting Turpin, 959 F.2d at 1352).
151.
Id.
152.
United States v. Ewell, 252 F. Supp. 2d 104, 115 (D.N.J. 2003).
153.
Id.
154.
See 472 F.3d at 403-13.
155.
Seifert, supra note 3, at 463.
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data mining for one purpose or another, 156 including Amazon, to detect
fraud. 157 Data mining used to combat healthcare fraud uses the same techniques as these industries. 158 Doctors themselves use data mining to analyze
clinical information.159 Like the DNA technique, data mining has been used
extensively outside the courtroom and thus satisfies the non-judicial criteria
of Daubert.
The next Daubert factor to be considered is testing. Whether a theory
has been tested is one of the most important factors to be considered in16a1
Daubert analysis 160 because testing is what creates scientific knowledge.
The testing separates science from speculation. 162 In Chapman v. Maytag,
the Seventh Circuit did not allow an expert's testimony1 63 theorizing that 64a
malfunctioning appliance caused a power surge that killed the victim'
because he never tested his theory. 65
Data mining to detect healthcare fraud has been tested. Researchers
tested data mining with a real world data set from Taiwan.1 66 They used
data from National Health Insurance in Taiwan. 167 Their
results showed that
168
data mining is an effective fraud detection technique.
Unlike the techniques discussed above, which were disallowed because they were untested, data mining to detect healthcare fraud has been
tested. It thus satisfies the testing requirement of Daubert.
The next factor considered is peer review. Courts consider peer review
to determine if a technique is "good science."' 169 A lack of peer review is

156.
Amir Hormozi & Stacy Giles, Data Mining: A Competitive Weapon for Banking
and Retail Industries, INFO. SYS. MGMT. 62, 62 (2004).
157.
Dearne, supra note 14, at 43.
158.
Appleby, supra note 1, at lB.
159.
Tom Mitchell, Machine Learning and Data Mining: Machine Learning Algorithms Enable Discovery of Important "Regularities" in Large Data Sets, COMM. ACM,
Nov. 1999, at 31-32.
160.
Chapman v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Bradley v.
Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1994)).
161.
Id. at 688 (citing Bradley, 42 F.3d at 438).
162.
Bickel v. Pfizer, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 918,922 (N.D. Ind. 2006).
163.
297 F.3d at 688.
164.
Id. at 686.
165.
Id. at 688.
166.
Wan-Shiou Yang & San-Yih Hwang, A Process-Mining Frameworkfor the
Detection of Healthcare Fraud and Abuse, 31 EXPERT SYS. WITH APPLICATIONS 56, 67
(2006).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169.
Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993)).
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considered to indicate poor science. 70 Courts have not hesitated to exclude
techniques that have not been peer reviewed.''
Conversely, peer review has been mentioned as a reason to allow expert testimony. 172 The D.C. Circuit allowed the ion mobility technique of
determining if a substance is cocaine t73
after the FBI chemist testified that
many papers had been written about it.
In Quiet Tech DC-8 v. Hurel-Dubois UK, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit considered the technique of computer modeling of jet engines. 174 The plaintiff in that case argued that the defendant had failed to
design a jet engine to specifications.1 75 The court allowed the computer
modeling
technique because it had been evaluated in peer reviewed jour76
nals.
Like the computer modeling technique, data mining, as mentioned
above, has been evaluated in peer reviewed journals. 177 It thus satisfies that
Daubert criteria.
Independent research is another Daubert factor, as it shows reliability. t 78 Courts view research prepared for litigation dubiously. 7 9 As discussed above, data mining has been researched extensively outside the judicial context.
Novelty is the final Daubert factor discussed. Novelty may make a
particular technique inadmissible. 80 In Mike's Train House, one of the reasons the court disallowed the expert's testimony was because no one else
had used his technique of evaluating designs. 18 1 As discussed above, data
mining is used extensively both to detect healthcare fraud and for other
reasons. It is therefore not novel and thus satisfies this Daubert criterion.

170.
Id.
171.
Wilson v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 303 F. App'x 708, 714 (11 th Cir. 2008).
172.
United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 912 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Ambrosini v.
Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
173.
Id. at 912.
174.
326 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11 th Cir. 2003).
175.
Id. at 1336.
176.
Id. at 1343-44.
177.
Yang & Hwang, supra note 166, at 67; see also Seifert, supra note 3, at 463.
178.
Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, 484 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2007).
179.
Id.
180.
Mike's Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, L.L.C., 472 F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir. 2006).
181.
Id.
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The Frye Standard

2.

The older Frye standard is still used in many states to evaluate an expert's methodology. 82 Its standard also comprises part of the Daubert standard. This section of the article will apply the Frye standard to data mining
to detect medical fraud.
The standard for admissibility under Frye is general acceptance within
the scientific community.' 83 The standard is meant to prevent unproven
scientific techniques from being used in court. 84 Frye allows scientists,
those most able to judge, the deciding
voice in whether to admit evidence
85
technique.
scientific
a
on
based
Frye requires a consensus in the scientific community, 186 but it does
not require all scientists to agree. 187 It is unclear what a consensus requires. 8 8 Some courts have said it requires a clear majority of members of
that community to agree, 189 while others have held a significant minority
would suffice. 190
In People v. Eyler, the Illinois Supreme Court applied the Frye standard to a technique of taking fingerprints. 191 The state obtained fingerprints
from a garbage bag containing the remains of the victim. 92 Those fingerprints were taken by the supergluing method,' 93 a method used twenty-five
percent of the time when taking fingerprints. 194 It had been used since
198 .'9' The FBI and police agencies in other countries used it.196 The Eyler
court held that this was sufficient to show that the technique was generally
accepted and thus satisfied the requirements of Frye. 97

182.

2003).

CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 652 (3d

ed.

183.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
184.
People v. Marsh, 429 N.W.2d 615, 618 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (citing People v.
Gonzales, 329 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Mich. 1982)).
185.
People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 325 (Cal. 1994) (citing People v. Kelly, 549
P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976)).
186.
DeMeyer v. Advantage Auto, 797 N.Y.S.2d 743 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (citing
People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 463-64 (N.Y. 1994) (Kaye, C.J., concurring)).
187.
See Leahy, 882 P.2d at 329-30.
188.
State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 201-02 (N.M. 1993).
189.
Id.
190.
Id.
191.
549 N.E.2d 268, 283 (Il. 1989).
192.
Id.
193.
Id. at 283-84.
194.
Id. at 284.
195.
Id.
196.
Eyler, 549 N.E.2d at 284-85.
197.
Id. at 286.
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In determining whether a technique is generally accepted, courts look
beyond case law. 98 Looking beyond the case law shows that data mining is
like the supergluing technique. It has been generally accepted as reliable as
it is used by thousands of institutions. 99 Fifty-two percent of Fortune 500
companies use some form of data mining. 2°° It is used in retail credit card
services and telecommunications. 2° 1 It is used by those industries to detect
fraud.2 °2 Well known companies like Amazon use it to detect fraud.2 °3
Many techniques used by those companies are used to detect healthcare fraud. 204 The use of data mining to detect fraud in healthcare is widespread. It has been used by insurance companies to detect fraudulent billing.205 Governments have used this system extensively to detect fraud.
Those governments include Utah,206 several counties in New York, 207 and
Australia.
208 It is also used by the United Kingdom Insurance Fraud Bu2 09
reau.
Doctors themselves use data mining, although not to detect fraud; it is
used to determine the effectiveness of medical treatments.2 10
Data mining is like the supergluing technique allowed by the court. Its
extensive use shows its general acceptance in the scientific community by a
majority, or at least a very significant minority, of scientists.
3.

Conclusion

Data mining satisfies both the Frye and Daubert tests. It satisfies the
relevant Daubert criteria for determining reliability. It has been tested and
peer reviewed, for example. It satisfies the Frye test as well. Data mining
has been generally accepted for detecting fraud both inside and outside the

198.
199.
44, 44.

People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 462 (N.Y. 1994) (Kaye, C.J., concurring).
Ann Milley, Healthcare and Datamining,HEALTH MGMT. TECH., Aug. 2000, at

200.
Hormozi & Giles, supra note 156, at 62.
201.
Id. at 66.
Seifert, supra note 3, at 463.
202.
203.
Deame, supra note 14, at 43.
204.
Appleby, supra note 1, at lB.
205.
Babcock & McGee, supra note 17, at 40.
206.
Milley, supra note 199, at 45.
207.
Phil Fairbanks, New Weapon to Fight Medicaid Fraud: Computer Program
Uncovers Illegal Practices by Local Health Care Providers, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 8, 2005,
at BI; see also James Goodman, Monroe to Put Byte on Health Cheaters, ROCHESTER
DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Mar. 12, 2006, at B 1.
208.
Dearne, supra note 14, at 43.
209.
Grant, supra note 18, at 133.
210.
Lisa Sokol et al., Precursory Steps to Mining HCFA Healthcare Claims, 34
HAW. INT'L CONF. ON SYS. SCI., at 1 (2001).
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medical arena. Many companies use it to detect fraud; many programs use
it to detect healthcare fraud.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The use of data mined evidence is clearly allowed under both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the common law. The use of past acts to prove
intent is allowed under both. Medical billing is a subject on which expert
testimony is proper due to its complexity. An expert may give evidence
relevant to intent without falling afoul of FRE 704(b) or the common law
ultimate issue prohibition. The methodology of data mining satisfies both
the Frye and Daubertstandards of admissibility.
In conclusion, an expert could testify that data mining indicated that a
doctor had committed fraud. In essence, the expert is testifying about what
the computer has inferred about the defendant's state of mind. The computer using data mining has read the doctor's mind and its conclusions are now
being used against the doctor in court. Such testimony would be admissible
in courts following either the Federal Rules of Evidence or common law.

